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Abstract. In this paper we consider the security of block ciphers which contain
alternate layers of invertible S-boxes and affine mappings (there are many popular
cryptosystems which use this structure, including the winner of the AES competition,
Rijndael). We show that a five-layer scheme with 128-bit plaintexts and 8-bit S-boxes
is surprisingly weak against what we call a multiset attack, even when all the S-boxes
and affine mappings are key dependent (and thus completely unknown to the attacker).
We tested the multiset attack with an actual implementation, which required just 216
chosen plaintexts and a few seconds on a single PC to find the 217 bits of information
in all the unknown elements of the scheme.
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1. Introduction
Structural cryptanalysis is the branch of cryptology which studies the security of cryp-
tosystems described by generic block diagrams. It analyzes the syntactic interaction be-
tween the various blocks, but ignores their semantic definition as particular functions.
Typical examples include meet in the middle attacks on double encryptions, the study of
various chaining structures, and the properties of Feistel structures with a small number
of rounds.
Structural attacks are often weaker than actual attacks on given cryptosystems, since
they cannot exploit particular weaknesses (such as bad differential properties or weak
avalanche effects) of concrete functions. The flip side of this is that they are applica-
ble to large classes of cryptosystems, including those in which some of the internal
† During this work, Alex Biryukov was with the Computer Science department of the Weizmann Institute
of Science and with ESAT/SCD-COSIC at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
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functions are unknown or key dependent, and thus they provide generic security lower
bounds. Structural attacks often lead to deeper theoretical understanding of fundamen-
tal constructions, and thus they are very useful in establishing general design rules for
strong cryptosystems.
The class of block ciphers considered in this paper are product ciphers which use
alternate layers of invertible S-boxes and affine mappings. This structure is a general-
ization of substitution/permutation networks (in which the affine mapping is just a bit
permutation) and a special case of Shannon’s encryption paradigm which mixes com-
plex local operations (called confusion) with simple global operations (called diffusion).
Substitution–permutation network (or SPN) is a popular terminology for such kind of
networks. However we think it is time to switch to a more exact substitution/linear
(SLN) or substitution/affine networks (SAN) terminology, since modern designs use
linear or affine layers rather than just permutation layers which provide slower mixing.
There are many examples of substitution/affine ciphers in the literature, including Rijn-
dael [11], which has been selected as the winner of the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) competition. Structural attacks given in this paper provide a lower bound on the
number of layers a substitution/affine network (SAN) blockcipher should have. Roughly
speaking, any 3-round SAN (and thus any SLN or SPN) with reasonable size S-boxes
can be broken with a practical attack.1 In the rest of this paper we call SASAS a 3-round
SAN and not a 2.5 one since in most SANs the last affine/linear layer is omitted, e.g.,
128-bit key Rijndael has 10 rounds even though the last round has no affine layer. An-
other potential application of these attacks is the ability to recover the hidden internal
components of key-dependent permutations (S-boxes) [3].
The best attack on Rijndael (and its predecessor Square [5]) is based on the square
attack which exploits the knowledge of the S-box, the simplicity of the key schedule
and the relatively slow avalanche of the sparse affine mapping (which linearly mixes
bytes only along the rows and columns of some matrix and adds a subkey to the result).
It can break versions with six S-box layers and six affine layers (a seventh layer can be
added if the attacker is willing to guess its 128-bit subkey in a nonpractical attack).
In our structural attacks we do not know anything about the S-boxes, the affine map-
pings, or the key schedule, since they can all be defined in a complex key-dependent
way. In particular, we have to assume that the avalanche is complete after a single layer
of an unknown dense affine mapping and that any attempt to guess even a small fraction
of the key would require a nonpractical amount of time. Consequently, we cannot use
the square attack (even though we are influenced by some of its underlying ideas), and
we have to consider a somewhat smaller number of layers.
In this paper we describe surprisingly efficient structural attacks on substitution/affine
structures with five to seven layers. The main scheme we attack is the five-layer scheme
S3A2S2A1S1 (see Fig. 1) in which each S layer contains k invertible S-boxes which
map m bits to m bits, and each A layer contains an invertible affine mapping of vectors
1 As a recent cryptanalysis of round reduced versions of block-cipher SAFER++ shows, breaking 3
rounds of well-designed SPN via conventional differential or linear attacks might require impractical com-
plexities of more than 2100 steps [9], while the multiset attack presented in this work would give an “off
the shelf” break for 3-rounds of SAFER++ in less than 228 steps. As expected, dedicated multiset attacks
which exploit specific properties of the S-boxes and the diffusion layer break more rounds, namely 4.5 out of
7 rounds of SAFER++ [4].
Structural Cryptanalysis of SASAS 507
Fig. 1. Five-layer scheme.
of n = km bits over GF(2):
Ai(x) = Lix ⊕ Bi.
The only information available to the attacker is the fact that the block cipher has this
general structure, and the values of k and m. Since all the S-boxes and affine map-
pings are assumed to be different and secret, the key length of this five-layer scheme is
approximated by
3 · 2m(m − 1.44) · n
m
+ 2(n2 + n).
Taking into account that the order of the S-boxes is relevant only for the 1st layer and
that S-boxes may be defined only up to a representative of an affine equivalence class






where |Gm| ≈ 0.29 · 2m2 is the number of m × m invertible affine mappings.
The new attack is applicable to any choice of m and n, but to simplify the analysis, we
concentrate on the Rijndael-like parameters of m = 8 bit S-boxes and n = 128 bit plain-
texts. The key length of this version is about 3 · 212 · 6.56 + 215 + 212 ≈ 113,600 ≈ 217
bits, which makes exhaustive search or meet in the middle attacks completely impracti-
cal. While some keys are equivalent, the number of redundant key bits (which is about
4500, via the formula shown above) is much smaller than the total number of key bits,
and thus it is not the cause of the success of our structural attack. Our attack requires
only about 216 chosen plaintexts and 228 time to find all the unknown elements. This is
quite close to the information bound since the 216 given ciphertexts contain at most 223
bits of information about the 217 key bits.
It is important to note that not all the information about the S-boxes and the affine
mappings can be extracted from the scheme, since there are many equivalent keys which
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Table 1. Summary of structural attacks.
Attack Scheme n m Key size Dataa Typeb Time Memorya
This paper, Sect. 4 SASAS n m 3n2m + 2n2 22m CP nm 23m 22m
This paper SASAS 128 8 217 216 CP 228 216
This paper SASAS 1024 16 228 232 CP 254 232
Biham’s attack [2] ASASAc n m m2m+1 + 3n2 2n/2 ACPd 2n/2 2n/2
Biham’s attack ASASA 64 8 214 230 ACP 230 230
Biham’s attack ASASA 128 8 216 260 ACP 260 260
aExpressed in the number of n-bit blocks.
bCP—Chosen Plaintext, ACP—Adaptive Chosen Plaintext.
cThe scheme has nonbijective S-boxes.
dSince ASASA was proposed as a public key scheme, the adaptive chosen plaintext attack is always available
to the attacker.
yield the same mapping from plaintexts to ciphertexts. For example, we can change
the order of various S-boxes in a single layer and compensate for it by changing the
definition of the adjacent affine mapping. In a similar way, we can move the additive
constants in the affine mappings into the definition of the adjacent S-boxes. Our attack
finds an equivalent representation of all the elements in the scheme which makes it
possible to encrypt and decrypt arbitrary texts, but it may be different from the original
definition of these elements. Note also that the successful attack on a small number of
rounds using unknown S-boxes does not imply that key-dependent S-boxes should be
avoided in designs using a larger number of layers. In fact, the problem of breaking
either ASASA (with bijective S-boxes) or SASASA (with bijective or nonbijective
S-boxes) is still open.
A related structural attack on a five-layer substitution/affine structure was recently
published by Biham [2]. He attacked the slightly different structure A3S2A2S1A1 (with
two S-box layers and three affine layers) proposed by Patarin and Goubin in [10] as a
new algebraic public key cryptosystem called 2R. However, in this scheme the S-boxes
are implemented by multivariate quadratic polynomials, which are nonbijective due to
design constraints. The starting point of Biham’s attack is the existence of random col-
lisions created by such S-boxes, and its time and data complexities were forced by
the birthday paradox to be at least 260. Biham’s attack is thus inapplicable to substitu-
tion/affine structures with invertible operations which have no collisions and has higher
complexity than our attack. Table 1 provides a summary of structural attacks.
2. Multiset Properties
In this section we develop a calculus of multiset properties, which makes it possible to
characterize intermediate values deep in the encryption structure even though nothing
is known about the actual functions in it. Each multiset can be represented as a list of
(value, multiplicity) pairs (e.g., the multiset {1,1,1,2,2,2,2,7} can also be represented
as (1,3), (2,4), (7,1)). The size of the multiset is the sum of all its multiplicities (8 in
this example). We now define several multiset properties:
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Definition 1. A multiset M of m-bit values has property C (constant) if it contains an
arbitrary number of repetitions of a single value.
Definition 2. A multiset M of m-bit values has property P (permutation) if it contains
exactly once each one of the 2m possible values.
Definition 3. A multiset M of m-bit values has property E (even) if each value occurs
an even number of times (including no occurrences at all).
Definition 4. A multiset M of m-bit values has property B (balanced) if the XOR of
all the values (taken with their multiplicities) is the zero vector 0m.
Definition 5. A multiset M of m-bit values has property D (dual) if it has either
property P or property E.
We will consider now the issue of how the multiset properties defined above are trans-
formed by various mappings. In general if a bijective function is applied to a multiset,
we get a new multiset with possibly new values, but the same collection of multiplicities.
If a nonbijective function is applied to a multiset, then the multiplicities of several dis-
tinct input values that are mapped to a common output value are added. The following
observations are easy to prove:
Lemma 1.
1. Any multiset with either property E or property P (when m > 1) also has prop-
erty B .
2. The E and C properties are preserved by arbitrary functions over m-bit values.
3. The P property is preserved by arbitrary bijective functions over m-bit values.
4. The B property is preserved by an arbitrary linear mapping from m bits to n bits
when m > 1. It is preserved by arbitrary affine mappings when the size of the
multiset is even.
Let us consider now blocks of larger size n = k · m with mixed multiset properties.
For example, we denote by Ci−1PCk−i a multiset with the property that when we
decompose each n bit value into k consecutive blocks of m contiguous bits, k − 1 of
the blocks contain (possibly different) constants across the multiset, and the ith block
contains exactly once each one of the 2m possible m-bit values. Similarly, we denote
by Dk a multiset that decomposes into k multisets each one of which has property D.
This decomposition should be understood not as a cross product of k multisets but
as a collection of k projections of n-bit to m-bit values. Note that this decomposition
operation is usually nonreversible, since we lose the order in which the values in the
various blocks are combined. For example, the multiset decomposition
{0,1,2,3}{1,1,2,2}{1,1,1,1}
(which has the multiset property PEC for m = 2) can be derived from several different
multisets such as {(011), (111), (221), (321)} or {(021), (121), (211), (311)}.
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Let us consider now how these extended multiset properties are transformed by layers
of S-boxes and affine mappings:
Lemma 2.
1. Property Ci−1PCk−i is preserved by a layer of arbitrary S-boxes provided that
the ith S-box is bijective.
2. Property Dk is transformed into property Dk by a layer of bijective S-boxes.
3. Property Dk is transformed into Bk by an arbitrary linear mapping on n bits and
by an arbitrary affine mapping when the size of the multiset is even.
4. Property Ci−1PCk−i is transformed into property Dk by an arbitrary affine map-
ping when the size of the multiset is even.






a bit yj at the output of the linear mapping. Property B holds since for each j , the sum

















The last expression is zero since by Lemma 1, claim 1, both P and E (and thus D)
imply the B-property. The result remains true even when we replace the linear mapping
by an affine mapping if we XOR the additive constant an even number of times.
Let us now show why claim 4 holds. Any affine mapping over GF(2) can be divided
into k distinct n to m-bit projections. Since (k − 1)m of the input bits are constant, we
will be interested only in restrictions of these affine mappings to new affine mappings
that map the ith block of m bits (the one which has the P property) into some other
m-bit block in the output:
y = Aij (x) = Lij · x ⊕ Bj , j = 1, . . . , k.
Here Lij is an arbitrary m × m (not necessarily invertible) binary matrix, and Bj ∈
{0,1}m. We can again ignore Bj since it is XOR’ed an even number of times. If Lij is
invertible over GF(2), then Lij · x is a 1–1 transform, and thus Lij · x gets all the 2m
possible values when x ranges over all the 2m possible inputs, and so it has property P .
Thus we are left with the case of noninvertible Lij . Suppose that
rank(Lij ) = r < m.
The kernel is defined as the set of solutions of the homogeneous linear equation
Lij · x = 0. Let x0 be some solution of the nonhomogeneous equation Lij · x = y.
Then all the solutions of the nonhomogeneous equation have the form x0 ⊕ v0, where
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v0 is any vector from the kernel. The size of the kernel is 2m−r , and thus each y has
either no preimages or exactly 2m−r preimages. Since r < m by assumption, 2m−r is
even, and thus the multiset of m-bit results has property E. Consequently each block of
m bits of the output has either property P or property E, and thus the n-bit output has
property Dk , as claimed. 
3. The Multiset Attack
In the existing literature a variety of names: “Square attack” [5], “saturation attack” [8],
“integral attack” [7], “internal collision attack” [6] have been used so far for what we
think represents a single family of attacks. All these attacks have one thing in common:
they all study the propagation of multisets through the cipher. We suggest to call such
class of attacks multiset attacks.
3.1. Attack on SASAS: Recovering Layers S1 and S3
The first phase of the attack finds the two outermost layers S1 and S3, in order to “peel
them off” and attack the inner layers.
Consider a multiset of chosen plaintexts with property Ci−1PCk−i . The key obser-
vations behind the attack are:
1. The given multiset is transformed by layer S1 into a multiset with property
Ci−1PCk−i by Lemma 2, claim 1.
2. The multiset Ci−1PCk−i is transformed by the affine mapping A1 into a multiset
with property Dk by Lemma 2, claim 4.
3. The multiset property Dk is preserved by layer S2, and thus the output multiset is
also Dk , by Lemma 2, claim 2.
4. The multiset property Dk is not necessarily preserved by the affine mapping A2,
but the weaker property Bk is preserved.
5. We can now express the fact that the collection of inputs to each S-box in S3 sat-
isfies property B by a homogeneous linear equation. We will operate with m-bit
quantities at once as if working over GF(2m) (XOR and ADD are the same in this
field). Variable zi represents the m-bit input to the S-box which produces i as an
output (i.e., the variables describe S−1, which is well defined since S is invert-
ible), and we use 2m separate variables for each S-box in S3. When we are given
a collection of actual ciphertexts, we can use their m-bit projections as indices to
the variables and equate the XOR of the indexed variables to 0m. Different col-
lections of chosen plaintexts are likely to generate linear equations with different
random looking subsets of variables (in which repetitions are canceled in pairs).
When sufficiently many linear equations are obtained, we can solve the system by
Gaussian elimination in order to recover all the S-boxes in S3 in parallel.
Figure 2 shows propagation of the multiset properties through the SASAS scheme.
Unfortunately, we cannot get a system of equations with a full rank of 2m. Consider
the truth table of the inverted S-box as a 2m × m-bit matrix. Since the S-box is bijec-
tive, the columns of this matrix are m linearly independent 2m-bit vectors. Any linear
combination of the S-box input bits (which are outputs of the inverted S-box) is also
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Fig. 2. Propagation of the multisets through the SASAS scheme.
a possible solution, and thus the solution space must have a dimension of at least m.
Moreover, since all our equations are XORs of an even number (2m) of variables, the
bit complement of any solution is also a solution. Since the system of linear equations
has a kernel of dimension at least m + 1, there are at most 2m − m − 1 linearly inde-
pendent equations in our system. When we tested this issue in an actual implementation
of the attack for m = 8, we always got a linear system of rank 247 in 256 variables, as
expected from the formula.
Fortunately, this rank deficiency is not a problem in our attack. When we pick any
one of the nonzero solutions, we do not get the “true” S−1, but A(S−1), where A is an
arbitrary invertible affine mapping over m-bits. By taking the inverse we obtain S(A−1).
This is the best we can hope for at this phase, since the arbitrarily chosen A−1 can be
compensated for when we find A(A2) = A′2 instead of the “true” affine transform A2,
and thus the various solutions are simply equivalent keys which represent the same
plaintext/ciphertext mapping.
A single collection of 2m chosen plaintexts gives rise to one linear equation in the 2m
unknowns in each one of the k S-boxes in layer S3. To get 2m equations, we can use 22m
(216) chosen plaintexts of the form (A,u,B,v,C), in which we place the P structures
u and v at any two block locations, and choose A,B,C as arbitrary constants. For each
fixed value of u, we get a single equation by varying v through all the possible 2m
values. However, we can get an additional equation by fixing v and varying u through
all the 2m possible values. Since we get 2 ·2m equations in 2m unknowns, we can reduce
the number of chosen plaintexts to 34 ·22m by eliminating the 14 of the plaintexts in which
u and v are simultaneously chosen in the top half of their range. The matrix of these
(u, v) values has a missing top-right quarter, and we get half the equations we need from
the full rows and half the equations we need from the full columns of this “L” shaped
matrix.
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Solving each system of linear equations by Gaussian elimination requires 23m steps,
and thus we need k23m steps to find all the S-boxes in S3. For the Rijndael-like choice of
parameters n = 128, m = 8, and k = 16, we get a very modest time complexity of 228.
To find the other external layer S1, we can use the same attack in the reverse direction.
However, the resultant attack requires both chosen plaintexts and chosen ciphertexts.
In Sect. 3 we describe a slightly more complicated attack which requires only chosen
plaintexts in all its phases.
3.2. Attacking the Inner Layers ASA
The second phase of the attack finds the middle three layers. We are left with a structure
A′2S2A′1 of two (possibly modified) affine layers and an S-box layer in the middle. In
order to recover the affine layers, we use Biham’s low-rank detection technique from [2].
Consider an arbitrary pair of known plaintexts P1 and P2 with difference P1 ⊕P2. With
probability about2 k/2m, after A′1 there will be a zero difference at the input to at least
one of the k S-boxes in S2. Thus there will also be a zero difference at the output of
this S-box. Consider now the set of pairs P1 ⊕ Ci , P2 ⊕ Ci for many randomly chosen
n-bit constants Ci . Any pair in this set still has this property, and thus the set of all the
obtained output differences after A′2 will have a rank of at most n − m, which is highly
unusual for random n-dimensional vectors. Consequently, we can confirm the desired
property of the original pair P1 and P2 by applying this low-rank test with about n
modifiers Ci .
We want to generate and test pairs with zero input differences at each one of the k
S-boxes. We choose a pool of t random vectors Pj and another pool of n modifiers Ci ,
and encrypt all the nt combinations Pj ⊕Ci . We have about t2/2 possible pairs of Pj ’s,
each one of them has a probability of k/2m to have the desired property at one of the
S-boxes, and we need about k · log(k) random successes to cover all the k S-boxes. The
critical value of t thus satisfies t2/2 · k/2m = k · log(k), and thus t = √2m+1 log(k).
For n = 128, m = 8, and k = 16, we get t = 25.5, and thus the total number of chosen
plaintexts we need is nt = 212.5, which is much smaller than the number we used in the
first phase of the attack.
Now we use linear algebra in order to find the structure of A′2. Consider the represen-
tation of A′2 as a set of n vectors V0,V1, . . . Vn−1, Vi ∈ {0,1}n, where A′2 transforms an





(we can ignore the affine constants viewing them as part of the S-box). From the data
pool we extract information about k different linear subspaces of dimension n − m
(= 120). Then we calculate the intersection of any k − 1 (= 15) of them. This intersec-
tion is an m-dimensional linear subspace which is generated by all the possible outputs
from one of the S-boxes in layer S2, after it is expanded from 8 bits to 128 bits by A′2. We
perform this operation for each S-box, and by this we find a linear mapping A∗2 which
2 Holds when k  2m, otherwise exact probability is 1 − (1 − 1/2m)k .
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is equivalent to the original choice. The complexity of this phase is that of Gaussian
elimination on a set of O(n − m) equations.
After finding and discarding A′2, we are left with the two-layer structure S2A′1. If we
need to perform only decryption, we can recover this combined mapping by writing
formal expressions for each bit and then solving the linear equations with k2m (212)
variables. If we also need to perform encryption, this trick will not work, since the for-
mal expressions will be huge. However, we can just repeat our attack in the reverse
direction by using chosen ciphertexts and recover A∗1. After that, we can find the re-
maining layer S2 with about 2m known plaintexts. Again we will find not the real S-box
layer S2 but the equivalent one which corresponds to the modified A∗1, A∗2 that we have
found in earlier phases.
Comment for one of the mappings, we need to know the order of the subspaces: we
can assume arbitrary order of subspaces in A2 together with arbitrary order of S-boxes
in S2, however at this point the order of subspaces in A1 is no longer arbitrary. If after
finding A2 we mount the same attack on S2A1 from the ciphertext direction, we can
recover A′1 together with the correct ordering information.
The complete attack uses about 22m chosen plaintexts (216) and about k23m
(16 · 224 = 228) steps. We tested the attack with an actual implementation, and it al-
ways ended successfully after a few seconds of computation on a single PC. The attack
remains practical even if we increase the size of the plaintexts from 128 to 1024 bits
and replace the 8-bit S-boxes by 16-bit S-boxes, since with these parameters, the attack
requires 232 chosen plaintexts and 64 · 23·16 = 254 time.
4. A Chosen Plaintext Attack on SASAS
In this section we show how to use a pure chosen plaintext attack and avoid the less
realistic chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext attack. The modified attack has the same
time and data complexities as the original attack.
After the first phase of the original attack we are left with an A′2S2A1S1 structure,
since we can recover only one of the two external S-box layers. Since the inputs go
through the additional S-box layer S1, we can no longer argue that for any Ci , P1 ⊕ Ci
and P2 ⊕ Ci will have a zero difference at the input to some S-box in S2 whenever P1
and P2 have this property. We thus have to use a more structured set of modifiers which
can be nonzero only at the inputs to the S-boxes in which P1 and P2 are identical.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider in this section only the standard parameters.
We use 216 chosen plaintexts with the multiset property PPCk−2 (the two P ’s could
be placed anywhere, and we could reuse the chosen plaintexts from the first phase of
the attack). There are about 215 different ways to choose a pair of values from the
first P . For each such pair (a1, a2), we generate a group of 28 pairs of extensions of the
form (a1, b0, c, d, . . .) and (a2, b0, c, d, . . .), where b0 is any common element from the
second P , and c, d, . . . are the constants from Ck−2. We claim that all these 28 pairs
will have the same difference at the output of S1, since the first S-box gets a fixed pair
of values and the other S-boxes get identical inputs in each pair. We can now apply the
low-rank test since we have sufficiently many choices of (a1, a2) to get a zero difference
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at the input to each S-box in S2 with high probability, and for any such (a1, a2), we have
sufficiently many pairs with the same difference in order to reliably test the rank of the
output vectors. Once we discover the partition of the output space into 16 different
linear subspaces of dimension 120, we can again find the intersection of any 15 of them
in order to find the 8-dimensional subspace generated by the outputs of each one of the
16 S-boxes. We fix A′2 by choosing any set of 8 arbitrary spanning vectors in each one
of the 16 subspaces, and this is the best we can possibly do in order to characterize A′2
due to the existence of equivalent keys.
One possible problem with this compact collection of plaintexts is that the attack
may fail for certain degenerate choices of affine mappings. In an extreme example, if
both A1 and A2 are the identity mapping, the insufficiently mixed intermediate values
always lead to very low output ranks. Arguably however the case of random affine
mappings which results in full mixing is the most challenging for the attacker. In actual
experiments, the attack was always successful when tested with randomly chosen affine
mappings.
After peeling off the computed A′2, we are now left with an S′2A1S1 structure, which
is different from the A′2S2A′1 structure we faced in the original attack. We have already
discovered in the previous part of the attack many groups of 256 pairs of plaintexts,
where in each group we know that the XOR of each pair of inputs to any particular
S-box in S′2 is the same constant. We do not know the value of this constant, but we
can express this property as a chain of homogeneous linear equations in terms of the
values of the inverse S-box, which are indexed by the known outputs from the S′2A1S1
structure. A typical example of the equations generated from one group is
S−1(1) ⊕ S−1(72) = S−1(255) ⊕ S−1(13) = S−1(167) ⊕ S−1(217) = · · · .
If we need additional equations, we simply use another one of the 215 possible groups of
pairs, which yields a different chain of equations (with a different unknown constant).
Note that these sparse linear equations are completely different from the dense equations
we got in the first phase of the attack, which expressed the B property by equating the
XORs of various random looking subsets of 256 variables to 0m. This analysis reuses
about 2m+1 chosen plaintexts from the previous stages of the attack. Another approach
for analyzing SAS which uses n
m
more data is explained in [2].
We are finally left with a simple A′1S1 structure. We can recover the affine layer A′1
using the low-rank detection technique from Sect. 3.2. Low-rank differences at the input
of A′1 can be created directly since we control the input of the S-boxes S1.
Comments
– The attack works in exactly the same way if the affine mappings are over finite
fields with even characteristic. In particular, it can be applied to Rijndael-like
schemes in which the affine transforms are over GF(28).
– The attack can be extended to the case where S2 contains arbitrary random (not
necessarily bijective) S-boxes with a small penalty in the number of chosen plain-
texts. Direct application of our attack will not work, since the P property at the
input to some S-box in layer S2 may not result in a balanced output after S2 if this
particular S-box is nonbijective. In order to overcome this difficulty, we can work
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with double-sized 2m-bit S-boxes at layer S1. We consider a projection mapping
PT 1 from 2m to m bits (in the affine mapping A1) which necessarily has a nonzero
kernel (and thus always has the E property which is preserved even by nonbijective
S-boxes, and not the P property which is not preserved by nonbijective S-boxes).
The attack works in exactly the same way with the exception that we pay a factor
of 2m in data and in the process of equation preparation (now each equation is the
XOR of 22m variables instead of 2m). The total complexity of the attack becomes
23m chosen plaintexts and k23m steps.
– We can attack the scheme even if a sparse linear mapping (a bit permutation or a
mapping that mixes small sets of bits like the Serpent [1] mappings) is added to
the input. The attack works as long as we can guess columns of the linear mapping
that correspond to the inputs of one particular S-box in S1. If we add an initial
bit permutation with the standard parameters, we can guess which 8 plaintext bits
enter this S-box and construct the Ci−1PCk−i structure we need to get each linear
equation with just this knowledge. Note that to generate the P property, we can
choose these 8 bits in an unordered way and to generate the other Ck−1 property,
we do not care about the destination of the other bits under the bit permutation, and
thus the number of cases we have to consider is at most
(128
8
) ≈ 240. By increasing
the time complexity of the attack by this number, we get a (barely practical) attack
on this six-layer scheme. By symmetry, we can also attack the scheme in which the
additional bit permutation layer is added at the end, and with a somewhat higher
complexity, we can attack the seven-layer scheme in which we add unknown bit
permutations both at the beginning and at the end of the scheme. It is an open
problem whether we can attack with reasonable complexity six-layer schemes with
a general affine mapping added either at the beginning or at the end.
– We can attack the scheme even if the S-boxes have inputs of different sizes which
are unknown to the attacker, since this information will be revealed by rank analy-
sis.
– We can attack modified schemes which have various types of feedback connections
between the S-boxes in the first and last rounds (see Fig. 3 for one example). The
idea is that we still have some control over multisets in such construction: We can
cause the rightmost S-box to run through all the possible inputs (if the XORed
feedback is a constant) and thus can force multisets to have the Ck−1P property
after S1 even when the indicated feedback connections are added. The extraction
of the S-boxes in the last layer S3 has to be carried out sequentially from right to
left, in order to take into account the effect of the feedbacks at the bottom.
– The attack stops working if S3 contains nonbijective S-boxes. One can estimate the
sizes of the equivalence (collision) classes of the outputs of the particular S-box
and thus distinguish such a cipher from a random permutation. However, even
writing the linear equations does not seem possible: If we get the same output
value twice in our structure, we cannot tell which variables should be used as the
input of the S-box in each case.
– We can attack the extended scheme KSA(SASAS)ASK if the additional S-boxes
are known and the affine mappings are known and are sparse (like in Rijndael) and
whitening keys are added at the top and at the bottom. This extension is very similar
to the extension of the Square attack by two rounds at the top and the bottom at the
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Fig. 3. Modified scheme with S-box feedbacks.
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expense of guessing keybits covering particular S-boxes at the added layers. This
attack depends on the sparseness of the affine mapping and the knowledge of the
S’s and the A’s in the added layers.
5. Summary
In this work we have studied structural properties of generic substitution-affine networks
(SANs) consisting of three rounds (five layers) of unknown or key-dependent m × m-
bit S-boxes and n × n-bit affine layers. We show very efficient multiset attacks on such
schemes with complexities of 22m chosen plaintexts and n
m
23m time steps. These attacks
are very efficient for typical AES-like parameters of n = 128 and m = 8, requiring only
216 chosen plaintexts and 228 time steps. These attacks thus show a lower bound on the
security of any 3-round SAN. They can be also used to recover the hidden structure of
key-dependent S-boxes in case where those were constructed using five or less layers of
secret substitutions and affine mappings. Cryptanalysis of ASASA or SASASA with
bijective S-boxes and no additional knowledge about the structure of S and A layers is
still an open problem.
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